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Big data: A normal accident waiting to happen? 
 
Abstract 
 
Widespread commercial use of the internet has significantly increased the volume and scope 
of data being collected by organisations. ‘Big data’ has emerged as a term to encapsulate both 
the technical and commercial aspects of this growing data collection activity. To date, much 
of the discussion of big data has centred upon its transformational potential for innovation 
and efficiency, yet there has been less reflection on its wider implications beyond commercial 
value creation. This paper builds upon normal accident theory (NAT) to analyse the broader 
ethical implications of big data. It argues that the strategies behind big data require 
organisational systems that leave them vulnerable to normal accidents, that is to say some 
form of accident or disaster that is both unanticipated and inevitable. Whilst NAT has 
previously focused on the consequences of physical accidents, this paper suggests a new form 
of system accident that we label data accidents. These have distinct, less tangible and more 
complex characteristics and raise significant questions over the role of individual privacy in a 
‘data society’. The paper concludes by considering the ways in which the risks of such data 
accidents might be managed or mitigated.  
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Introduction 
 
“Don’t be evil. We believe strongly that in the long term, we will be better served — as 
shareholders and in all other ways — by a company that does good things for the world even 
if we forgo some short term gains.” Google IPO Prospectus, 2004 
Over the last decade, as usage of the internet has grown so too has interest in exploitation of 
the data generated by an increasingly technologically connected society (George et al., 2014). 
In the 1998 film 'Enemy of the State' a rogue government agency is portrayed as having 
unlimited access to personal data from emails, telephone conversations and other data 
sources. At the time the scenario was so shocking to the FBI that a PR campaign was 
launched to reassure the public that the plot was purely fiction (Miller, 2013). Yet, as recent 
revelations about data and privacy have made clear, the forms of surveillance present in this 
fictional account are now very real. What has changed is the role of governments as 
collectors of data, and the increasing importance of commercial entities as the drivers of both 
data collection and analysis. Previous generations of information technology were dominated 
by firms with expertise in hardware or software, many leading internet firms now have 
commercial strategies built around the collection of data. For firms such as Google, Facebook 
and others, the collection of data has become an end in itself rather than a way of achieving 
other ancillary business goals. This comes at a time when there is increasing interest from 
researchers in the ethical implications of wider data use in areas such as data privacy (Hong 
& Thong, 2013), cyber hacking (Bambauer, 2014), government regulation (Fink et al., 2012) 
and intellectual property (Bateman et al., 2013). In addition there is concern over the extent 
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of government surveillance of commercial social networks as a result of leaks by Edward 
Snowden (Witte, 2013). 
Within this context the term big data has gained popularity in both business and public policy 
circles as a label encapsulating the technical and commercial aspects of new types of personal 
data collection (Nunan & Di Domenico, 2013). To date, much of the discussion of big data 
has focused on the potential for positive impacts both for business and society (George et al., 
2014). This goes beyond improvements to commercial efficiency and extends to claims about 
its transformational impact upon areas such healthcare and the delivery of public services 
(Manyika et al., 2011). Yet, there has been relatively little reflection on, or theoretical 
development of, the ethical issues raised by big data. This is perhaps unsurprising given the 
paucity of research on internet ethics (Schlegelmilch & Oberseder, 2010) and that 
understanding the ethical implications of new technologies lags behind their implementation 
(De George, 2003). This paper argues for reflection upon the wider ethical implications of 
big data, not least because the ‘don’t be evil’ philosophy adopted by Google in 2004 seems, a 
decade later, to be a naïve reflection of technology firms’ role in the collection and 
exploitation of personal data. At the same time this slogan captures the complex, and 
sometimes contradictory, ethical stances taken by organisations that have enabled this data 
explosion to occur. 
 
This paper analyses the ethical issues around big data through the lens of normal accident 
theory (NAT). Normal accidents are normal in the sense that these negative events are 
inevitable and occur where organisational systems are both complex and tightly coupled 
(Perrow, 1984). NAT has been applied to the study of physical accidents including nuclear 
power stations (Perrow, 1981; 1984; Pidgeon, 2011), military ‘friendly fire’ (Snook, 2000), 
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plane crashes (Helmreich, 1997) and the recent failures in the financial system (Palmer & 
Maher, 2010). It is argued that the emerging forms of organisation that are enabling big data 
have the system characteristics identified by NAT.  However, the consequences of normal 
accidents in these data-centric organisations are less immediately tangible than with a 
physical disaster, making identification and remedy more difficult. The paper proposes a 
form of data accident that extends the theory of normal accidents to take account of the scale, 
interconnectedness and uncertainty generated through the exploitation of data in 
contemporary society. In doing so an ethical dilemma is highlighted, whereby the 
consequences of such inevitable data accidents must be balanced with the utility gained by 
the public through the use of these technologies. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by identifying the key aspects of big data and 
the types of organisation that enable, and are enabled by, this growth in data collection. 
Secondly, we outline normal accident theory and the characteristics of organisational systems 
that have been seen to enable such accidents. Thirdly, we extend NAT by suggesting both the 
characteristics and potential consequences of a data accident. Finally, we follow Perrow 
(1999) and consider both the question of what should be done and, given the increasing 
commercial significance of big data, what can be done to mitigate the unforeseen 
consequences of big data.  
 
Introducing Big Data 
Although data has become closely associated with information technology, managing and 
making sense of data is an age old problem. Historians, politicians and military leaders have 
relied on information as a source of power for centuries, whilst preventing access to 
information has long been a lever for removing power. However, what has changed is the 
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volume of data under consideration. When, in the 1850s, managers of US railroads sought 
new organisational designs to help overcome the challenges of the ‘data avalanche’ in a 
growing business, they were talking about a volume of data that did not even add up to a 
single megabyte in modern terms (Rosenthal, 2014). By contrast, a key characteristic of data 
in contemporary business is the constant, and almost exponential, growth in its volume. To 
use one contemporary statistic, 90% of all data in existence has been created in the last two 
years (IBM, 2015). 
 
In this context big data initially emerged as a term to describe the technical innovations 
underpinning the massive increase in data being collected (Jacobs, 2009). Beyond enabling 
more data to be collected, the technology has also changed the velocity and variety of data 
that can be collected and analysed (IBM, 2015). Velocity refers to the speed with which data 
can be collected and analysed, with real-time analysis becoming a possibility with even very 
large data sets. Variety is significant as it signals a shift away from simply collecting data in 
text form towards data in video, audio and image formats (Kuechler, 2007). More recently, 
big data has moved beyond its technical roots to encompass a broad range of commercial 
opportunities enabled through the analysis of such data (Manyika et al., 2011). As it has done 
so, the term has been adopted by politicians as the means of achieving economic growth. In 
the UK big data has become one of eight key government priorities (HM Government, 2013) 
and in the US Barrack Obama’s use of campaign data has led to him being referred to as the 
‘big data President’ (Hurwitz, 2012).  
 
This technological innovation is paired with a number of economic factors. First, the cost of 
storing data has reduced to the point that it may now be economically viable to store all forms 
of data, even if there is no immediate use for it. A second economic factor is the widespread 
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availability of both the necessary software and hardware.  Much of the software that supports 
big data has emerged not from traditional technology companies, but from organisations 
where necessity has driven them to find solutions to their own big data problems. Crucially, 
for the wider use of big data, much of this technology has been made available through open 
source licences, enabling other organisations to more easily use and adapt the technology for 
their own needs (Nunan & Di Domenico, 2013).  
 
Generating value from big data 
Clearly, big data creates the potential for a wide range of commercial possibilities and 
innovations. The most widely known examples originate from the major internet companies 
for whom data collection and analysis is a core competency. For example, as Marcus (2012) 
illustrates, Google was able to develop a more effective spell checker not through knowledge 
of natural language analysis or the psychology of spelling, but through collecting and 
analysing a massive database of actual spelling corrections:  
 
“What did users most often type next after failing to find what they wanted with the 
word “peopple”? Aha, “people.”… The lesson, it seemed, was that with a big enough 
database and fast enough computers, human problems could be solved without much 
insight into the particulars of the human mind”  
 
Other examples that work on similar principles include the recommendation engines used by 
Amazon and Netflix that leverage large databases of consumer preferences on books or films 
to make recommendations for future watching. However, despite the high profile of such 
cases the commercial benefits of big data are not limited to internet firms. Indeed, the 
McKinsey report that served to popularise big data as a commercial strategy (Manyika et al., 
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2011) highlights the potential in healthcare, public service delivery in local government and 
financial services.  For example, in a healthcare environment characterized by fragmented 
datasets big data has been proposed as both a mechanism to help control spiraling costs and a 
way of speeding up the R&D process for new pharmaceutical techniques (Groves et al., 
2013). An aspect of the commercial application of big data that has, perhaps, resulted in 
many gains being less public is the incremental nature of the improvements to existing 
processes. Put another way, many of the cases of big data uses are about improving existing 
processes rather than inventing new businesses. A powerful example of this comes from the 
shift in airlines from relying on pilots to provide ETA (estimated time of arrival) information 
through to using a data driven system combining multiple sources including weather, radar 
and flight schedules (McAffee & Brynjolfsson, 2012). Whilst busy pilots would previously 
make estimates that were often generally accurate, at least 30% were more than five minutes 
out. By combining multiple data points through an automated algorithm, airlines have been 
able to virtually eliminate gaps between estimated and actual arrival times, saving individual 
airports millions of dollars per year (McAffee & Brynjolfsson, 2012). 
 
What draws these examples together and makes them ‘big data’ is that value is created 
through large scale analysis of data, not just collection, and the combination of multiple data 
sets. Although these examples help to demonstrate the positive commercial benefits of big 
data, the question of the wider implications for big data, resulting through this commercial 
exploitation, remain ambiguous. Although the focus is often on the implications of the 
volume of information being collected, big data is less about size that is big than it is about a 
capacity to search, aggregate, and analyse large data sets (boyd & Crawford, 2012). That is 
not to say that there is not a high level of concern over the privacy implications of new 
technology. Concern about privacy implications of new technologies is nothing new whether 
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it is photography (Warren & Brandeis, 1890), personal computers (Zuboff, 1988) or the 
internet (Nissenbaum, 2004).  However, the nature of this concern has typically lagged 
behind the reality of the way that new technologies use and analyse data (Mundie, 2014).  
More specifically, concerns over privacy have been driven by fears over active and visible 
data collection rather than the sorts of passive and autonomous data collection allied to big 
data. Essentially, privacy concerns that relate directly to big data are less well articulated 
because users of technology are less able to appropriately understand or contextualise the 
ways in which the data is being collected and analysed. In turn, as this paper explores, this 
lack of context is driven by the unknown nature of the privacy risks. Returning to a core 
premise of big data, data is being collected because it is economical to do so and the potential 
for valuable analysis in the future exists. Because the use of the data is unknown, so too are 
the broader social implications. 
 
Normal Accident Theory 
 
“What seems certain… is that the problem of technological determinism - that is, of 
the impact of machines on history-will remain germane until there is forged a degree 
of public control over technology far greater than anything that now exists.” – 
Heilbroner, 1967:65 
 
The advancement of technology has always created a tension between economic benefits and 
social impact. As Heilbroner argues, the question is not whether technology in some ways 
defines societies, but the extent to which it does so. Although data may now seem a key 
factor in the debate over the ethical implications of computer technology, this was not always 
the case. In arguing for a form of ethical overload Coates (1982) identifies the very wide 
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range of ethical issues on which computer technology might touch. This includes speech 
recognition, biotechnology and the impact on workplace structure of home working, although 
there is little mention of the role of data itself. This highlights the challenge of predicting the 
consequences of technology, even when the technology itself is well understood, a challenge 
that the author captures in the statement that in this position “the new immorality is to act in 
ignorance of future consequences” (Coates, 1982:239).  
 
Although accidents and disasters have always been a characteristic of society, the complexity 
and embededness of modern technologies create an ever-greater need for understanding 
(Leveson et al., 2009). Normal accident theory (NAT) has its origins in an attempt to explain 
the consequences of such complex technologies and the need for better understanding of the 
causes of the catastrophic accidents they cause. The root of the theory goes back to when 
sociologist Charles Perrow was asked to provide a background report for the President's 
Commission on The Accident at Three Mile Island, following the 1979 nuclear accident at the 
power station on the site. The report found that the accident was not caused, as might have 
been expected, by an isolated technical fault or human error but by a series of organisational 
factors present in systems, such as those in a nuclear power station, that are both complex and 
tightly coupled (Perrow, 1981; 1984). The focus of the report was therefore not on finding 
who was to blame, but on how organisational systems had developed to enable such accidents 
to take place.  
 
The types of systems in which normal accidents occur have two key characteristics: 
interactive complexity and tight coupling (Pidgeon, 2011). Interactive complexity refers to 
chains of events that occur in sequences that are unfamiliar or unplanned. This is as opposed 
to linear interactivity that occurs in an expected, familiar, visible and planned way (Perrow, 
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1984). Linearity implies not that the system is simple (i.e. lacking in complexity) but rather 
that events happen in a linear fashion. Thus, production lines for pharmaceuticals or the flight 
of an airplane are linear in the sense that they are processes that can be explained, but they 
are by no means simple. Accidents can, and do, occur in such environments, but through their 
linear nature the impacts of such accidents can be more easily identified and remedied. In 
linear systems, such as a production line, when unplanned events happen, they can be easily 
located and remedied by employees (Perrow, 1984). On the other hand, complex interactivity 
occurs where interactions are not fully understood, at least by those who have to make the 
time critical decisions required to mitigate against accidents (Perrow, 1984). 
 
The second component of a normal accident, independent from complex interactivity, is the 
requirement for tight coupling. Where tight coupling occurs, interactions occur quickly and in 
a way that is unobstructed as components within a system impact each other, allowing 
incidents to escalate into accidents. In this context 'accident' has a specific definition 
associated with a major systems failure, as opposed to a more minor and routine failure that 
Perrow (1984) labels an incident. As such, an accident is not simply a failure of part of a 
system but of a system as a whole. The significance of this is that for a system accident to 
occur multiple failures must happen.  
 
“It is not the source of the accident that distinguishes the two types, since both start 
with component failures; it is the presence or not of multiple failures that interact in 
unanticipated ways.” (Perrow, 1984:71) 
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Critiques of normal accident theory 
One challenge with NAT is that the use of the term system isn't formally defined by Perrow, 
despite the concept of a system being at the heart of the theory (Shrivastava et al., 2009). 
However, in using this term NAT is able to shift the focus from individual failure to the 
failure of systems. Another way of putting this is that individuals no longer become the cause 
of normal accidents, whilst instead it is the organisational systems in which the accidents 
occur that are to blame (Cummings, 1984).   
 
The term normal accident is both memorable and a little misleading as an accident is only 
'normal' in the sense that in a certain set of organisational circumstances accidents become 
inevitable. This inevitability of accidents has been the source of discussion and controversy, 
as high reliability theorists (HRT) have argued that it is possible to design organisations 
which are complex and tightly coupled yet are able to survive normal accidents (Roberts, 
1990). The debate between NAT and HRT has continued since (Sagan, 1993; Rijpma, 1997; 
Shrivastava et al., 2009; Perrow, 2008), with multiple, largely unsuccessful, attempts to 
‘break through the deadlock’ (Rijpma, 1997:15). Perrow’s response is that most types of 
accidents, even complex accidents involving multiple failures, can be prevented whilst 
normal accidents are inevitable and therefore a feature of the system (Perrow, 1999). The 
central message of NAT is therefore not about risk prevention but of dealing with the 
consequences of normal accidents. This is a challenging message, one that calls into question 
the overall relationship between technology and society. However, Perrow remains unmoved 
on this central point: 
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“I have a simple message: disasters from natural, industrial and technological sources, 
and from deliberate sources such as terrorism, are inevitable, and increasing. We may 
prevent some and mitigate some, but we cannot escape them.” (Perrow, 2008:733) 
 
It is this message of inevitability and inescapability that distinguishes NAT from other 
theories of technology risk, and it is this point that creates particular salience when applying 
to the issues around big data.  
 
Normal accidents and big data 
The argument of this paper is not that big data causes normal accidents, but rather that it is 
central in creating forms of organisation, and organisational systems, in which normal 
accidents are likely to occur. To make this argument we analyse big data through the core 
components of NAT - tight coupling and complexity. In addition, we extend the theory 
through consideration of the specific organisational context in which big data occurs.  
 
The first of these components is that big data has the characteristics of a tightly coupled 
system. This may appear to be a counterintuitive argument considering that the internet itself 
is an archetype of a loosely coupled system, designed in a cold war era to survive the 
destruction of any one of its parts. However, behind big data lies tightly connected 
infrastructure and firms that bind together the organisations reliant on this technology. This is 
characterised by a shift away from organisations exerting full control over their technology 
‘stack’ and towards cloud computing, where storage and processing power is treated as a 
utility. Although organisations may develop the software that runs, and collects data, to 
maximise efficiency, they are increasingly reliant on the use of large data centres run by 
firms such as Amazon, Microsoft or Google. For all but the very largest firms, the efficiency 
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and perceived resilience offered by these multi-billion dollar data-centres make it a necessity 
to use third party storage for technology. Yet, when there is a failure in data-centres, the 
consequences are far more widespread, unexpected and unpredictable than when firms had 
more control over their own infrastructures.  For example, an accidental deletion of a small 
amount of data by a developer in the software that balances traffic between different servers 
using Amazon Web Services1 on Christmas Eve 2012 resulted in a chain of events that 
rendered online services, including Netflix, unavailable on Christmas morning (Cockcroft, 
2012). In their apology for the incident (Amazon, 2012) Amazon highlighted that only a very 
small number of developers had access to this data, the developer did not initially realize the 
mistake and, for the first few hours, the technical teams were puzzled by the error messages 
being generated by their system. This issue was fixed not through technical means, but by 
implementing a process to ensure changes to systems were double-checked to avoid 
accidental deletion in the future.  
 
Secondly, related to this loose coupling, the distributed nature of the way in which big data is 
collected and stored creates inherent complexity with multiple organisations and multiple 
technologies. Going back to the example given previously of the Netflix failure, what is even 
more significant is that the Netflix was reliant on another organisation’s infrastructure to 
deliver much of its content. In this case an organisation with which it competes directly, 
Amazon’s Instant Video service. Whilst a few firms can achieve a degree of vertical 
integration most are reliant on an increasing web of third parties. Taking a theoretical 
example of a mid-size online retailer in addition to hosting the website, reliance upon other 
websites might include payment services (such as credit cards Paypal, Apple Pay), 
                                                 
1 Amazon Web Services is a cloud storage service run by Amazon that allows other firms to make use 
of Amazon’s data-centres and computer processing power for their websites and online services.  
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integration with social media, content delivery networks for video content, integration with a 
third party CRM, courier and delivery services, web analytics tools, and advertising servers, 
to name but a few. This is on top of the complexity inherent in the data itself, a complexity 
reflected in the increasing concern over the ability to find suitably skilled employees with the 
ability to effectively analyse such data (Brown et al., 2014).    
Thirdly, a distinguishing characteristic of normal accidents and big data is the lack of a 
shared understanding over risk. Organisations that have previously been used as cases of 
normal accidents can be characterised by a clear understanding of what constitutes an 
accident, even if they may disagree with the extent to which such accidents can be considered 
as ‘normal’. Furthermore, previous organisations that collected very large amounts of data 
were often governments who had clear incentives to maintain privacy because, in the absence 
of a commercial incentives, ensuring limited access to the data also meant increasing levels 
of control. By contrast, the commercial demands of many of the firms that enable big data are 
built around both the indiscriminate collection of data and encouraging sharing of data. When 
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg says ‘privacy is dead’, even looking beyond the rhetoric, 
they are signalling that the underlying culture relating to data risk and privacy is different. 
This creates a tension in the types of activity that generate commercial value that can also be 
responsible for the forms of normal accidents we describe in this paper. 
To summarise this argument we refer back to the four types of organisational system in NAT, 
defined by whether there is tight or loose coupling and where interactions are complex or 
linear. Table 1 provides a quadrant that illustrates this categorisation of systems together a 
scenario of types of data-based failures that might occur in each of these categories. It is the 
top right-hand corner that links to normal accident theory where systems are both complex 
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and tightly coupled. Reflecting on this quadrant, one of the difficulties is that the more 
abstract nature of the concept of data makes characterisations based upon normal ‘physical’ 
accidents less effective. To accommodate the characteristics of big data we therefore suggest 
that there exists an alternative form of data accident. 
 
Table 1 goes about here. 
 
Data Accidents 
 
It is proposed that normal accidents involving big data have certain characteristics that 
distinguish them from the types of physical accident accounted for by existing theories of 
normal accidents (Perrow, 1999; Snook, 2000). The term data rather than information is used 
deliberately as a key facet of big data is the collection of unstructured rather than structured 
data. The application of structure to data means, in technical terms, defining the 
characteristics of the data to be collected before the data collection process begins. For 
example, specifying that certain data is an image, or sound or text, or that it is a name, time or 
currency. The act of structuring data before collection implies that some thought has been 
given to the eventual use of the data. This may seem like a semantic point, but it serves to 
reinforce one of the key technological norms of big data: that data can be collected regardless 
of, and potentially without knowledge of, the purpose for which it is to be finally used.  
 
Following from Perrow (1984) we consider data accidents through the lens of two recent 
examples. These are the two widely publicised cases of information leaks occurring through 
two individuals associated with the US government - Bradley Manning leaking US 
diplomatic cables to the Wikileaks site, and Edward Snowden leaking classified NSA data to 
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various media organisations. These examples are used not because they are direct examples 
for the commercial use of big data – they are not – but because they allow the exploration of 
questions around the characteristics of data accidents.  
 
One point that requires clarification is the use of the term ‘accident’ to describe something 
that, in the Manning/Snowden case the original data leaks were not caused by activities that 
could be described as accidental. This use of the term ‘accident’ is one that has caused some 
confusion in the normal accident/high-reliability organisation debate (Leveson et al., 2009). 
However, the sorts of accident being referred to here are a form of system accident caused by 
unpredictable interactions within the system. In other words, the accident referred to is a form 
of failure within the system itself, not an individual act. Thus, in the case of the Snowden 
scenario the accident refers to the failure in a system designed, in all circumstances, to 
prevent leaks of data rather than the intent of Snowden himself.  
 
As with the example given previously of Amazon (Cockcroft, 2012), these data accidents 
occurred through a combination of unforeseen events. The Wikileaks incident occurred 
through a low level employee, Bradley Manning, copying data, primarily diplomatic cables, 
to a CD-R and then contacting the media (Leigh, 2010). The exact mechanism through which 
Edward Snowden removed data from the NSA is unknown, although it involved downloading 
data from a PC to a simple USB thumb drive (Waterman, 2013). This apparently simple 
mechanism was not considered as computers containing sensitive information are supposed 
to have the USB ports disabled (Waterman, 2013).  
 
Critically, the existence of both accidents was not apparent until the data actually came to be 
used. At time of writing, the full significance of the Snowden leaks is unknown due to 
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uncertainty over its extent, and whether data remains to be released. In both cases the 
authorities were not aware of the loss of data until it was released to the media for analysis. 
Additionally, it was not the work of a foreign government or a criminal conspiracy involving 
multiple actors. Rather, it was the result of a single - relatively junior - employee who was 
able to leverage possibly unavoidable characteristics of the organisation together with the 
ability to quickly access and transfer large amounts of data. The key question that is raised by 
these examples is: If individual members of staff in a high security organisational 
environment are able to remove and publicly distribute large amounts of unstructured data, 
much of it, at least in the Snowden case, classified 'Top Secret', then to what extent can it be 
assumed that commercial applications of big data will not suffer from the same issue?  
 
Characteristics of data accidents 
This question of the potential for commercial data accidents is difficult to estimate directly 
as, unlike the Snowden case, most data accidents are not public by nature. Rather, they have a 
number of characteristics which differentiate them from the more traditional physical 
accidents previously associated with NAT. These characteristics make such data accidents 
more difficult to observe, prevent and remedy. 
 
The first difference relates to the lack of physical artifacts, making it difficult to identify 
when an accident has happened. In the examples above, as in many others, the first sign of a 
data accident occurs when the data has been put to use. Thus, although the incidents of a 
nuclear accident can be quantified by the physical location, a data accident only makes its 
presence felt by the subsequent (mis)use of the data.  
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Secondly, the impact of data accidents is typically neither geographically specific nor 
geographically located. Organisations collecting data may be nationally based, at least in 
normative legal terms, but the nature of the internet allows them to collect data on individuals 
from around the world with few limitations. Where data is lost, legally or otherwise, it can 
spread around the world quickly. This lack of geographical bounding has a number of 
implications in terms of jurisdiction when it comes to both limiting the impact of such 
accidents and preventing their spread (Allen & Overy, 2013).  
 
Thirdly, the timeframes in which the impacts of data accidents are felt can be hard to predict. 
Once it has occurred, the impacts of a typical physical accident can, to an extent, be 
estimated. However, with data accidents the impact is only felt through the analysis of data 
and the dissemination of this analysis. Even here, the impact can be extended by weeks, 
months or even years into the future as new means of data analysis become available (Nunan 
& Di Domenico, 2013).  
 
Limitations within normal accident theory 
To effectively build upon the theories of normal accidents, it is necessary to acknowledge 
certain limitations within NAT. The first is the apparent absence of the real world forms of 
normal accidents suggested by the theory, suggesting that there many exist highly reliable 
organisations that can design-out such accidents (Leveson, et al., 2009). Shrivastava et al. 
(2009) suggest that the absence of the sort of system accidents posited by Perrow (1984) 
demonstrates that such use of examples is, in part, an attempt by Perrow to fit the data to 
support a theory. This is an extension of the argument made by Cummings (1984) that, in 
arguing for NAT, Perrow goes beyond theoretical scholarship to instead challenge us as to 
the extent to which we need systems that may be so complex as to be uncontrollable. One 
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example is the “Y2K” problem where, writing nine months before the turn of the new 
millennium, and thus without the benefit of hindsight, Perrow (1999:390) states: 
 
 "Y2K could be the quintessential Normal Accident of both the 20th and 21st 
centuries...Y2K has the potential for making a linear, loosely coupled system more 
complex and tightly coupled than anyone had any reason to anticipate." 
 
Not only was the Y2K problem a normal accident that failed to happen, but also one that has 
at least some of the same underlying characteristics as big data. For many researchers and 
observers Y2K provided an archetype case for considering the moral and social impacts of 
technology. Yet the real world impact of Y2K was minimal (MacGregor, 2003). Thus in one 
sense, the argument for normal accidents is undermined by the absence of the accident (La 
Porte & Consolini, 1991). More recently Perrow reflects upon this in the context of the 
nuclear industry (Perrow, 2008). One answer is that public pressure in the face of those few 
accidents that happened, resulted in a regulatory regime that made it difficult for nuclear 
power to be established and, with the exception of France and Japan, nuclear power has 
remained a relatively limited power source. This regulatory structure also served to create a 
significantly different control structure with high costs, moratoria on the construction of new 
nuclear power stations, and a public ownership structure. An alternative approach, in the light 
of the Fukishima nuclear accident in Japan, would argue that Perrow had insufficiently long 
time frames. But the core contradiction remains, that limiting the potential of powerful 
technologies because of a hypothesised and unpredictable future is an unrealistic argument. 
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Responses to normal accidents  
If we accept the theoretical proposition that there are at least some forms of accidents that 
cannot be prevented, we are returned to asking the question, as Perrow himself does: "What 
must be done?" (Perrow, 1984:304). For systems where the risk is catastrophic, where the 
consequences of failure far outweigh potential benefits, Perrow suggests abandoning such 
systems whilst also acknowledging that these recommendations are unlikely to be practical in 
the real world. However, this assumes that it is possible to evaluate the risk of new 
technologies. Given the essential intangibility of data accidents, evaluating risks in a way that 
is likely to be useful, or utilisable, is somewhere between difficult and impossible. At the 
same time, the increasing embededness of data collection within public life means that the 
likely direction of big data is toward even bigger data. Yet, as we have argued in this paper, it 
is not the bigness of big data that creates the risk of information accidents, nor is it the 
existence of technology that enables more efficient storage and analysis of data. Rather, the 
risk emerges from the ambiguity surrounding the collection of data, leading to a modern day 
'gold-rush' where the company with the most data wins, even where the commercial value of 
that data is uncertain.  
 
One outcome would be the acceptance of both the costs that arise from a reduction in 
personal privacy, as well as any benefits from the reduction in general societal information 
asymmetry. However, this cannot be done without ignoring the legal and regulatory 
frameworks governing the collection and use of customer data. The history of regulating 
commercial activities relating to consumers suggests that regulation happens with a rear view 
mirror, as for example with the regulation of pharmaceuticals and tobacco. Thus, any 
adaptations to the regulatory environment will happen post hoc. Whilst the pace of regulation 
is often driven by the lobbying power of the industries involved and the effectiveness of 
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enforcement, the relationship between data collection and regulation is a more difficult 
complex. Firstly, there is the recognition amongst policy makers that existing regulations are 
insufficient in an environment where consumers themselves are complicit in so much of the 
generation and use of data. Secondly, there is the question of enforceability of regulations 
where data has increasingly cross-border characteristics and the jurisdiction is less clear. 
Thirdly, as social networks and other online services begin to resemble utilities, and indeed 
seek to describe themselves as utilities, they begin to resemble the types of organisations that 
are normally regulated. Finally, there is the changing environment of regulation itself where 
regulation is not only becoming increasingly common, but also the nature of regulation is 
changing (Bygrave, 2014). 
 
Discussion & Mitigation 
Having outlined potential consequences of big data, it is necessary to acknowledge the risk 
that, in effect, the paper appears to be attempting to predict the future. By using examples of 
accidents it is possible to make the cognitive leap towards imagining what such events would 
look like in a contemporary context, and make a further leap towards postulating about their 
impact. However, it is not the purpose of this paper to speculate about specific future 
scenarios, and to do so would misinterpret the uncertain and unpredictable nature of normal 
accidents. Accidents that can be predicted can be managed, and in some way mitigated. To 
repeat a previous point, the term 'normal' is used to indicate inevitability. Thus, the theory is 
suggesting that accidents will happen - not when or how they might happen. With this in 
mind, the question of mitigation refers not to specific types of incidents (e.g. “preventing” 
another Snowden leak) but rather addressing the underlying organisational context under 
which normal accidents occur. This would need a requirement to decouple and simplify these 
organisational contexts.  
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Despite these avenues for some form of risk reduction, we return to the basic paradox of big 
data and normal accident theory. The mitigating factors illustrated require both a shift in the 
level of acceptance, and movement in the direction of travel of corporate strategy, that 
acceptance would only be created through experiencing the consequences of these data 
accidents. Yet, the characteristics of these accidents are highly individual and ambiguous, and 
often unknown.  
 
As such, big data creates the forms of externalities that would normally be dealt with through 
the regulatory process. However, these very characteristics of individuality and ambiguity, 
together with the technical and commercial boundaries that underlie big data, have 
challenged the creation of effective regulations.  A clear example of this can be seen in the 
process of updating data protection legislation within the European Union to replace the 
existing outdated regulations from the 1990s, and standardise legislative approaches to 
privacy across Europe (Ashford, 2014). Firstly, the challenges of regulating across borders 
has led to attempts to apply legislation to major US social networks, in turn resulting in issues 
ranging from practical questions over the limitations of national jurisdiction through to 
threats of a trade war (Farivar, 2014). Secondly, attempts to regulate the ability of firms to 
actually collect data in a format that enables big data analysis will raise questions over the 
extent to which citizens are actively opposed to such data collection. For example, if new EU 
legislation resulted in Facebook limiting features or even withdrawing from the European 
market, would consumers be likely to be grateful for their enhanced privacy, or chastise the 
European Union for infringing upon their online ‘lives’?  
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Understanding the consequences of big data is made more difficult by the question of 
ownership over data or, more specifically, the usage rights granted when firms collect data. 
Ownership itself typically depends on the mechanism through which the data is collected, 
and much of the discussion in terms of regulation seeks to address the forms of asymmetry 
that are perceived to be occurring here. For example, when individuals sign-up to online 
services such as social media they provide a form of blanket consent through which they 
agree for their data to be used for an often unspecified range of purposes for an unspecified 
length of time. Such sign-ups provide a form of legal consent to enable the use of data, and 
thus de facto ownership for the period that an individual is a member of that service, but are 
unlikely to meet the requirements of traditional research based upon informed consent. 
Additionally, whilst the public might expect some level of ownership rights over the data 
they have collected, one of the characteristics of big data that we have discussed refers to the 
autonomous collection of data generated about individuals rather than by individuals. The 
value of this autonomously collected data, for example by sensors in cars, homes or 
buildings, might not be immediately clear even to those organisations collecting it. 
Furthermore, can there be an ownership debate over commercial data that the public may not 
even be aware is being collected? Finally, we have the overarching issue of whether the data 
is personal or not, as data protection legislation typically does not give individuals rights over 
their data when it has been aggregated and anonymized. One of the paradoxes of big data is 
that the same techniques that are used to analyse data through the combination of data sets 
can also be used to deanonymise existing data sets, creating personal data and ownership 
issues where none previously existed. Despite the core role that anonymisation plays in 
legislation, unlike in traditional forms of data analysis – such as market research – where the 
goal is to produce aggregate insights, the commercial benefits of big data are driven by the 
need for individual level data and analysis.  
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Two other avenues for mitigation must be considered. One intriguing possibility is change in 
behaviour by the commercial organisations that are the source of many of the big data 
challenges identified in this paper. Here a distinction must be drawn between large 
technology firms in general and the specific characteristics of those firms which have data 
collection as an end, rather than a means to an end. For those firms with strategies that do not 
require them to become what we might refer to as ‘data conglomerates’, there is an 
opportunity to develop a strategic positioning away from big data. A final, potentially 
limiting, factor comes down to the role of consumer behaviour itself. Firms such as Facebook 
have presumably shifted from, to quote Mark Zuckerberg again, a ‘privacy is dead’ 
philosophy to one that at least partially recognises the importance of privacy in consumer 
decision making.  This reflects research highlighting that consumers do take privacy into 
account when sharing data online, at least when it is with distrusted strangers (Johnson et al., 
2012).  Given the commercial drivers behind big data, this highlights that it is a reduction in 
acceptance from consumers that would drive the most effective longer term shift away from 
the big data economy.  
 
In presenting this discussion, it is necessary to acknowledge some potential limitations. The 
first is that normal accident theorists have previously been proved wrong, most notably with 
the Y2K incident. Yet this is a weakness not of the theory, but of attempts to use the theory to 
predict rather than explain. In his defence, Perrow argues that many people got their analysis 
of big data wrong, and that more broadly this demonstrates the challenges of analyzing risks 
associated with business technology without sufficient understanding of the technical aspects 
that underpin it. A second limitation relates to whether 'big data’ as a construct is useful for 
developing theories, or whether it is an ill-defined phrase, sufficiently vague in use to allow 
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for associations of technological progress without requiring precise knowledge of the nature 
of the progress. We accept that the use of the term 'big data' has perhaps outpaced its 
understanding; the term has arisen out of a very real need to understand the changes taking 
place in the way that data is collected and analysed in society. Thus our use of the term 
reflects our attempts to explain activities and behaviours that are already happening, where 
the term is already used, rather than attempting to invent new terms. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper discusses the increasingly important role of big data as part of organisational 
strategies and theorises the potential consequences of big data.  The paper suggests that big 
data enables the forms of organisational systems that have traditionally been associated with 
those susceptible to normal accidents. Additionally, the nature of accidents involving data 
results in a number of unique and complex characteristics that can be differentiated from the 
forms of physical accidents that have featured in NAT research to date. 
 
In doing so, the paper highlights a key change in the mechanism through which privacy 
becomes enforceable. Previously privacy could be maintained, at an individual level, through 
limiting access to the private sphere. For example, the system of surveillance undertaken by 
the Stasi in pre-1990s East Germany is often held up as a 'model' of how state surveillance was 
able to permeate this private sphere. Yet, what is notable is both the exceptional cost - both 
financial and social - and the extent to which it was unusual, even by the standards of 
totalitarian governments (Sebestyen, 2009).  With big data, managing privacy is about limiting 
access to data that already exists. Because the data being collected and their use are often 
unknown, maintaining privacy is dependent on the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
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organisational processes that prevent damaging forms of sharing. The argument of this paper 
is that the ethical issues with big data lie not so much with its collection but with the weaknesses 
in organisational processes and systems that enable it.  
 
However appealing, the use of “Orwellian” language in the context of discussions is 
misleading as it belies the increasing strategic importance of data to organisations. In reality 
big data is an inevitable by-product of modern technology-enabled consumer society. 
Accepting the core tenets of NAT (Perrow, 2009), data accidents have an inevitability. 
Avoiding them becomes not a matter of managing risk but of altering the fabric upon which 
modern consumer society is based. In presenting the argument in this paper we recognise the 
limitations of NAT but also seek to strengthen the theory within the contemporary context of 
accidents where technology, and the organisational systems that enable them, are increasingly 
digital, virtual and dispersed.  By doing so the paper furthers NAT in providing a lens 
through which to unpack the role of new technologies upon society. As the social perception 
of new technologies such as nuclear power turned from wonder to concern, we suggest the 
same will be the case for internet technology. Above all, the concept of NAT serves to 
remind organisations that they retain the choice of what data to collect, when to retain it, and 
how to build up stores of trust with their stakeholders to better navigate the consequences of 
any data accidents.  
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